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Date: April 29, 2024 Mon
Time: 9:22 pm
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Results for military personnel
9 results foundAuthor: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Military Personnel: Sustained Leadership and Oversight Needed to Improve DOD's Prevention and Treatment of Domestic Abuse Summary: In 2001, the Deputy Secretary of Defense stated that domestic violence will not be tolerated in the Department of Defense (DOD). Despite this posture, DOD's clinical database indicates that 8,223 incidents met criteria for domestic abuse in fiscal year 2009. However, because this database includes only cases reported to military clinical offices, it does not represent all cases. In response to a congressional request, GAO evaluated whether DOD is able to determine the effectiveness of its domestic abuse efforts. To conduct this review, GAO reviewed legislative requirements and DOD guidance, analyzed domestic abuse data, and interviewed officials involved in domestic abuse prevention and treatment and persons eligible to receive services at five military bases. DOD has taken some actions to prevent and treat domestic abuse in response to recommendations made by the Defense Task Force on Domestic Violence in 2001 through 2003 and by GAO in a 2006 report. However, DOD has no oversight framework with goals, milestones, and metrics with which to determine the effectiveness of its efforts. This issue is complicated by uncertainty regarding the completeness of DOD's data on domestic abuse. In 2007, DOD issued guidance on military protective orders after GAO had found that its lack of guidance had resulted in inconsistent practices. However, DOD closed its Family Violence Policy Office in 2007, which had staff dedicated to overseeing the implementation of recommendations made by the Defense Task Force, after DOD had taken action on some key recommendations. At that time, the specific responsibilities of that office for overseeing implementation of the remaining Task Force recommendations were not reassigned, although overall oversight responsibility remained with the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. DOD guidance assigns many domestic abuse-related responsibilities to this office, including responsibility for developing DOD's domestic abuse instruction and ensuring compliance. GAO found the following examples in which having sustained leadership attention and an oversight framework would have helped guide DOD in obtaining information that would allow it to fully manage its efforts and determine their effectiveness: (1) Significant DOD guidance has been in draft since 2006. As a result, the services are anticipating ways to implement the draft guidance, which contains, among other things, new guidelines for the services' clinical treatment and evaluation boards, without finalized guidance. (2) The database intended to satisfy legislative requirements enacted in 2000 continues to provide incomplete data, and DOD still collects domestic abuse data in two databases. In 2006, GAO reported on data discrepancies in these databases and recommended that they be reconciled. This recommendation remains open, and those problems continue today. Because DOD cannot provide accurate numbers of domestic abuse incidents, it cannot analyze trends. (3) It is DOD policy to target families most at risk of domestic abuse, but DOD has not defined goals for its efforts or metrics with which to measure progress. DOD collects only information on gender, rank, age, and substance use. Without information on other factors, such as length and number of deployments, DOD will be unable to fully analyze risk factors. During GAO's site visits, these factors were routinely mentioned. (4) DOD lacks metrics for measuring the effectiveness of its awareness campaigns. As a result, it does not know how to direct its resources most effectively. Without sustained leadership and an oversight framework, DOD will remain unable to assess the effectiveness of its efforts to prevent and treat domestic abuse. GAO recommends that DOD finalize guidance on how the services are to comply with DOD policies and develop an oversight framework to guide its efforts to prevent and treat domestic abuse that includes collecting data on contributing factors and establishing metrics to determine the effectiveness of DOD's awareness campaigns. In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD generally concurred with GAO's recommendations. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2010. 42p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-10-923: Accessed October 14, 2010 at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10923.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10923.pdf Shelf Number: 119965 Keywords: Domestic ViolenceFamily ViolenceMilitary PersonnelSpouse AbuseVictims of Family ViolenceViolence Against Women |
Author: Meyer, Maureen Title: Abused and Afraid in Ciudad Juarez: An Analysis of Human Rights Violations by the Military in Mexico Summary: Washington, DC: Washington Office on Latin America: Mexico: Miguel Agustin Pro Juarez Human Rights Center (Center Prodh), 2010. 15p. Details: This report focuses on human rights violations that occurred in Ciudad Juarez in the context of Joint Operation Chihuahua, which began in March 2008, and reviews the drug policies adopted by the Mexican government, with support from the U.S. government, to address the security crisis in Mexico. The report aims to give voice to some of the victims of the war against organized crime in Mexico: in particular, individuals who have been abused by the very security forces who are supposed to protect them. It does not seek to minimize the countless atrocities committed by drug trafficking organizations and other criminal groups in Mexico, which have been widely reported in the press. Rather, the report focuses on human rights violations — including forced disappearances, torture and arbitrary detentions — that have been committed by the Mexican government’s security forces, mainly the Mexican military, in the context of the counter-drug efforts in the country. The failure to hold soldiers responsible for the violations they commit leads to more abuses, weakens citizen trust, and undermines the population’s willingness to collaborate in the struggle against any type of crime. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 15, 2010 at: http://www.wola.org/images/stories/Mexico/wola%20prodh%20juarez%20report%20color.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.wola.org/images/stories/Mexico/wola%20prodh%20juarez%20report%20color.pdf Shelf Number: 119981 Keywords: Criminal ViolenceDrug TraffickingForced DisappearancesHuman RightsMilitary PersonnelOrganized CrimeTorture |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Preventing Sexual Harassment: DOD Needs Greater Leadership Commitment and an Oversight Framework Summary: Sexual harassment is a form of unlawful discrimination that can jeopardize the military's combat readiness and mission accomplishment by weakening interpersonal bonds and eroding unit cohesion. GAO was asked to examine the most current available data on sexual harassment in the military and to assess the Department of Defense's (DOD) efforts to address this issue. GAO evaluated the extent to which DOD (1) has developed and implemented policies and programs to help prevent and address incidents of sexual harassment involving servicemembers, (2) has visibility over the occurrence of sexual harassment involving servicemembers, and (3) provides oversight of its policies and programs for addressing incidents of sexual harassment. To conduct this review, GAO analyzed DOD and service policies and DOD's available sexual harassment complaint data. GAO also conducted small-group discussions and administered a nongeneralizable survey during site visits to six military installations. DOD has a long-standing policy aimed at providing an environment that is free from sexual harassment, and each of the military services has implemented its own polices and a program for addressing sexual harassment; however, some aspects of its policy and programs could be improved. For example, according to a 2010 DOD survey, while the majority of active duty servicemembers indicated that they believe that their immediate supervisor makes honest and reasonable efforts to stop sexual harassment, an estimated 25 percent of servicemembers indicated they did not know whether or did not believe their supervisor made such efforts. DOD's survey also found that an estimated 41 percent of servicemembers indicated that in their work group people would be able to get away with sexual harassment to some extent, even if it were reported. Similarly, GAO's nongeneralizable survey of active duty servicemembers found that 64 of 264 females and 53 of 319 males did not believe or were unsure of whether their direct supervisor created a climate that discourages sexual harassment from occurring. GAO also found that DOD has not held commanders accountable for completing required assessments of the equal opportunity climates in their commands. Further, GAO found that DOD does not have adequate guidance on how incidents of sexual harassment should be handled in environments wherein two or more of the services are operating together, resulting in confusion or reducing servicemembers' satisfaction with how complaints are handled. GAO found that DOD has limited visibility over the occurrence of sexual harassment because not all military installations and commands report sexual harassment complaint data to their respective service-level sexual harassment program offices and found that the department does not have a set of uniform data elements with which to collect such data. GAO also found that servicemembers resolve most complaints of sexual harassment informally rather than report them formally. Estimates from DOD's survey found that the majority of servicemembers who felt they were harassed sexually chose not to formally report the incident. Similarly, GAO's survey found that 82 of 583 servicemembers indicated that they had been harassed sexually during the preceding 12 months; of these, only 4 indicated that they had reported the incident formally. GAO found several reasons why servicemembers may choose not to report an incident, including the belief that the incident was not sufficiently serious to report or that the incident would not be taken seriously if reported. DOD has established some oversight requirements but has exercised little oversight of its policies and programs for addressing incidents of sexual harassment. GAO found that the office responsible for overseeing DOD's sexual harassment policies and programs has not developed an oversight framework--including clear goals, objectives, milestones, and metrics for measuring progress--to guide its efforts. For example, although DOD requires the services to provide an annual assessment of their programs, including specific data for sexual harassment complaints, DOD has not enforced these reporting requirements for almost a decade. Moreover, DOD's resources for oversight of this area are limited to one person, who has multiple other responsibilities. As a result, decision makers in DOD do not have the information they need to provide effective oversight, or assess the effectiveness, of the department's policies and programs. GAO is making a total of five recommendations to improve the implementation and oversight of DOD's sexual harassment policies and programs, such as specifying uniform data elements when collecting and reporting complaint data and developing an oversight framework to help guide the department's efforts. DOD concurred with GAO's recommendations and noted it will develop an executable plan, prioritize actions, and address resourcing for the changes recommended. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2011. 47p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-11-809: Accessed October 26, 2011 at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11809.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11809.pdf Shelf Number: 123149 Keywords: DiscriminationMilitary PersonnelSexual Harassment (U.S.) |
Author: Cheesman, Fred Title: Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Veterans Treatment Court Performance Measures Summary: Veterans Treatment Courts (VTCs) are a relatively new type of problem-solving court. The first VTC was implemented in Buffalo, NY in 2008, serving military veterans utilizing a combination of several problem-solving court models. Since then, the number of VTCs implemented across the country has grown significantly, including seventeen VTCs in Pennsylvania. The Administrative Office of Pennsylvania Courts (AOPC) has been proactive in applying lessons learned in other problem-solving courts to VTCs. To that end, the AOPC has collaborated with the National Center for State Courts (NCSC) to develop the first set of performance measures specifically designed for VTCs. Performance measurement is considered an essential activity in many government and non-profit agencies because it "has a common sense logic that is irrefutable, namely that agencies have a greater probability of achieving their goals and objectives if they use performance measures to monitor their progress along these lines and then take follow-up actions as necessary to insure success" (Poister, 2003). Effectively designed and implemented performance measurement systems provide tools for managers to exercise and maintain control over their organizations, as well as mechanisms for governing bodies and funding agencies to hold programs accountable for producing intended results. The argument for measuring VTC performance is compelling because VTCs must compete with other priorities of the criminal justice system for a finite amount of resources. This makes it incumbent upon VTCs to demonstrate both that the limited resources provided to them are used efficiently and that this expenditure of resources produces the desired participant outcomes. To this end, VTC performance measures (PMs) should demonstrate that participants are receiving evidence-based treatment in sufficient doses, thereby improving their capability to function effectively in society. Performance measures should also illustrate that participants are held accountable and public safety is protected. Performance measurement is distinct from program evaluation and consequently does not attempt to ascertain a VTC's "value-added" over an appropriate "business-as-usual" alternative (typically probation or incarceration). Rather, PMs provide timely information about key aspects of the performance of the VTC to program managers and staff, enabling them to identify effective practices and, if warranted, to take corrective actions. The NCSC philosophy for the development of PMs is guided by several important principles. First, we aim for a small number of measures targeting the most critical of VTC processes. Second, PMs are developed with significant input from stakeholders. NCSC acts an informed facilitator, offering suggestions and making recommendations for PMs, but the ultimate decision is made by the advisory committee convened by the commonwealth agency responsible for VTCs. Third, the target audiences for the PMs are individual VTCs. That is, these measures are intended to provide information to individual courts to improve their performance. The information generated by the PMs will also be useful to commonwealth policy makers, but they are not the primary target audience. Fourth, PMs are well-documented. Detailed specification sheets documenting data sources, calculations, and interpretation are written for each PM, leaving little equivocation about the details of the PM. During a two-day meeting convened on June 24-25, 2014, a select group of veterans court stakeholders, AOPC staff, and NCSC staff worked together to produce a set of commonwealth-wide performance measures for veterans treatment courts. The stakeholder group (henceforth the Performance Measures Work Group) was diverse but representative of a variety of critical viewpoints including veterans court judges, coordinators, attorneys, probation officers, veterans justice outreach specialists, treatment team members, and staff from the AOPC. The project and the work of the work group was informed by a number of resources. Since research on VTCs is still in its infancy, the limited amount of VTC-specific research was supplemented by other relevant research related to adult drug courts, mental health courts, and court performance measurement. First, the NCSC team provided a document that included core performance measures for adult drug treatment courts and suggestions for areas specific to veterans for which to develop measures. Second, the work group referenced the only set of nationally articulated measures for drug courts (developed by the National Research Advisory Committee (NRAC). The NRAC measures were incorporated in this report, though in some cases amended to fit the particular circumstances of Pennsylvania VTCs. Third, the discussion was informed by previous work conducted by NCSC to develop performance measures for drug and mental health courts in other states (see Rubio, Cheesman, and Federspiel, 2008) and the latest research on evidence-based practices (e.g. Carey, Mackin, and Finigan, 2012). Finally, the High Performance Court Framework (Ostrom and Hanson, 2010) was used to ensure that the selected measures provided a "balanced" perspective that represents competing values (e.g. productivity, effectiveness, access). Details: Williamsburg, VA: National Center for State Courts, 2015. 111p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 22, 2016 at: http://ncsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/singleitem/collection/spcts/id/302/rec/2 Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: http://ncsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/singleitem/collection/spcts/id/302/rec/2 Shelf Number: 138378 Keywords: Military PersonnelProblem Solving CourtsVeteransVeterans Treatment Courts |
Author: U.S. Department of Justice. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives Title: (U) OMGs and the Military 2014 Summary: (U//LES) The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF), Office of Strategic Intelligence and Information (OSII), Field Intelligence Support Branch, has prepared the following report to provide intelligence and analysis on outlaw motorcycle gangs (OMGs) in the United States military and Government. By working with our law enforcement (LE) counterparts, we continue to uncover new trends and patterns pertaining to OMGs in the military. As in previously disseminated OMGs and the Military reports, OSII notes that particular OMGs and their support clubs continue to court active-duty military personnel and government workers, both civilians and contractors, for their knowledge, reliable income, tactical skills and dedication to a cause. Through our extensive analysis, it has been revealed that a large number of support clubs are utilizing active-duty military personnel and U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) contractors and employees to spread their tentacles across the United States. Key Findings x OMG support clubs are recruiting a large number of active-duty military personnel. x Hells Angels, Vagos and Mongols in California continue to associate with OMG activeduty military personnel. x Outside Ft. Bragg and Eglin Air Force Bases, explosives have turned up in residences of United States Army Special Forces operators – unsubstantiated connections to an OMG or support club. x Violence between OMGs increased from 2012 to 2013. x The Bandidos continues to spearhead much of the violence across the Midwest. x Violence between the Pagans and HAMC is escalating in Virginia, but decreasing in Maryland. x Due to Pagans MC expansion, skirmishes have occurred between the Outlaws and Pagans. x The Hells Angels is fighting a two-front war in California with the Mongols and Vagos. x The “Dominant Six” continue to expand across the globe. x Black OMGs are rapidly expanding in the United States. x Expansion in the United States is hampering longstanding relationships between the Vagos and Mongols, Outlaws and Pagans, as well as the Bandidos and Vagos. x A large number of nontraditional OMGs are associating with the Hells Angels Motorcycle Club (HAMC) in California, North Carolina, Virginia, Washington, Arizona and Maryland. Details: Washington, DC: The Bureau, 2014. 40p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 28, 2016 at: https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/2085684/omgs-july-2014-redacted.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/2085684/omgs-july-2014-redacted.pdf Shelf Number: 140499 Keywords: Military PersonnelMotorcycle Gangs Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs |
Author: Mani, Kristina Title: Beyond the Pay: Current Illicit Activities of the Armed Forces in Central America Summary: The growth of criminal gangs and organized crime groups has created unprecedented challenges in Central America. Homicide rates are among the highest in the world, countries spend on average close to 10 percent of GDP to respond to the challenges of public insecurity, and the security forces are frequently overwhelmed and at times co-opted by the criminal groups they are increasingly tasked to counter. With some 90 percent of the 700 metric tons of cocaine trafficked from South America to the United States passing through Central America, the lure of aiding illegal traffickers through provision of arms, intelligence, or simply withholding or delaying the use of force is enormous. These conditions raise the question: to what extent are militaries in Central America compromised by illicit ties to criminal groups? The study focuses on three cases: Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Honduras. It finds that: - Although illicit ties between the military and criminal groups have grown in the last decade, militaries in these countries are not yet "lost" to criminal groups. - Supplying criminal groups with light arms from military stocks is typical and on the rise, but still not common. - In general the less exposed services, the navies and air forces, are the most reliable and effective ones in their roles in interdiction. - Of the three countries in the study, the Honduran military is the most worrying because it is embedded in a context where civilian corruption is extremely common, state institutions are notoriously weak, and the political system remains polarized and lacks the popular legitimacy and political will needed to make necessary reforms. - Overall, the armed forces in the three countries remain less compromised than civilian peers, particularly the police. However, in the worsening crime and insecurity context, there is a limited window of opportunity in which to introduce measures targeted toward the military, and such efforts can only succeed if opportunities for corruption in other sectors of the state, in particular in law enforcement and the justice system, are also addressed. Measures targeted toward the military should include: - Enhanced material benefits and professional education opportunities that open doors for soldiers in promising legitimate careers once they leave military service. - A clear system of rewards and punishments specifically designed to deter collusion with criminal groups. - More effective securing of military arsenals. - Skills and external oversight leveraged through combined operations, to build cooperation among those sectors of the military that have successful and clean records in countering criminal groups, and to expose weaker forces to effective best practices. Details: Miami: Western Hemisphere Security Analysis Center, Florida International University, 2011. 55p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 6, 2016 at: https://new.oberlin.edu/dotAsset/4690459.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Central African Republic URL: https://new.oberlin.edu/dotAsset/4690459.pdf Shelf Number: 140538 Keywords: Drug TraffickingGangsHomicidesMilitary PersonnelOrganized CrimeViolence |
Author: Parkin, William S. Title: Criminal Justice & Military Deaths at the Hands of Extremists Summary: As there have been a number of high profile incidents where extremists have targeted criminal justice personnel generally, and law enforcement officers specifically, it is important to provide some context with data on attacks over time. START researchers examined the United States Extremist Crime Database (ECDB) to provide analysis on attacks on agents of the criminal justice system and military personnel in the United States between 1990 and 2015. The ECDB identifies 66 criminal justice/military homicides perpetrated by an offender associated with either al-Qaida and its associated movement (AQAM) or far-right extremism (FRE) in this time period. This background report presents information on these incidents, the offenders and victims of these attacks. Details: College Park, MD: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), 2016. 7p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 26, 2017 at: https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_CriminalJusticeMilitaryDeathsbyExtremists_BackgroundReport_Nov2016.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_CriminalJusticeMilitaryDeathsbyExtremists_BackgroundReport_Nov2016.pdf Shelf Number: 147461 Keywords: Extremist GroupsExtremist ViolenceHomeland SecurityHomicidesMilitary PersonnelTerrorists |
Author: Kinosian, Sarah Title: Security for Sale: Challenges and Good Practices in Regulating Private Military and Security Companies in Latin America Summary: Just before midnight on March 2, 2016, assassins broke into Berta Caceres' home and murdered her in her bedroom. Caceres was an indigenous leader in a peaceful campaign against the Agua Zarca dam on a river considered sacred by the indigenous Lenca community of Honduras. In the months leading up to her death, Caceres, along with the resistance movement she led, endured threats, smear campaigns, physical assaults, sexual assaults and forced eviction. The recently-arrested executive president of the company building the dam, Desarrollos Energeticos SA, (DESA), was a former military intelligence officer. On DESA's board sits a former justice minister and several members of one of the richest and most powerful families in Honduras. An international group of lawyers studying the case established "shareholders, executives, managers, and employees of Desarrollos Energeticos Sociedad Anonima (DESA); private security companies working for DESA; and public officials and State security agencies implemented different strategies to violate the right to prior, free and informed consultation of the Lenca indigenous people. The strategy was to control, neutralize and eliminate any opposition." So far nine people have been arrested, four of whom have ties to the Honduran military. Among many other issues, including high-level corruption, the Caceres assassination is emblematic of many problems associated with the private sector security industry in Latin America. The lines between current and retired military personnel and the private company were blurred. There was an interwoven network of current military, former military, private security, business elites and government officials. The dispute involved an energy project opposed by a local community, a context in which many of the worst Private Military and Security Company (PMSC) abuses occur across the region. The sustained use of surveillance, threats, and force against the Lenca community-culminating with Caceres' assassination- was excessive and politicized, clearly violating the rules of engagement for public and private security forces. Some of the individuals responsible for the murder were only arrested after significant international outcry, but most of the masterminds behind the killing remain free. Details: Washington, DC: The Dialogue, 2018. 20p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 16, 2018 at: https://www.thedialogue.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Security-for-Sale-FINAL-ENGLISH.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Latin America URL: https://www.thedialogue.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Security-for-Sale-FINAL-ENGLISH.pdf Shelf Number: 149813 Keywords: Citizen SecurityMilitary PersonnelPrivate SecurityPrivatizationSecurity Companies |
Author: Smith, Carter F. Title: Perceptions of Gang Investigators Regarding Presence of Military-Trained Gang Members Summary: Roughly 80% of all crimes in the United States are committed by members of criminal gangs (NGIC, 2009). FBI researchers surveyed state and local law enforcement agencies and estimated there were one million gang members in the U.S. (NGIC, 2009). Some gang members enlist in the military as an alternative to incarceration, and others join the military to recruit members into their gang, obtain access to weapons, and learn how to respond to hostile gunfire (NGIC). The increase in the number of military-trained gang members created a level of danger most law enforcement officials are not prepared to combat (NGIC). The threat increases because all MTGMs were or will be discharged from the military at some point, either due to inappropriate activity or because their commitment to military service was satisfied. The problem addressed in this quantitative study is an assessment of the presence of MTGMs in civilian communities. The number of crimes committed by these gang members has increased significantly since 2002. In 2006, investigators with Army CID found a 265% increase in reported gang-related incidents and investigations from 2005 to 2006 (CID, 2006). The 2009 Gang Threat Assessment yielded similar results, with a twofold increase since the 2006 report.There has been little research on the presence of MTGMs and fewer studies have examined factors that impact investigator's perceptions of the presence of MTGM populations. This study may fill some of the gaps. Details: Prescott Valley, AZ: Northcentral University, 2010. 192p. Source: Dissertation. Available from the Rutgers Criminal Justice Library. Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: Shelf Number: 150034 Keywords: Gang ViolenceGang-Related ViolenceGangsMilitary personnel |